Michigan Law Review
Volume 70

Issue 3

1972

The Constitutionality of Candidate Filing Fees
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Election Law Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, The Constitutionality of Candidate Filing Fees, 70 MICH. L. REV. 558 (1972).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol70/iss3/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

NOTES
The Constitutionality of Candidate Filing Fees
I.

INTRODUCTION

Early in the twentieth century a "progressive impulse"1 captured
the energies of this country's burgeoning urban middle class. Sickened by the corruption and scandals of the nineteenth century and
fearful of the rising influx of European immigration,2 the so-called
Progressives began working for political reform. The emphasis of
this reform was primarily structural. Rather than by a remodeling
of the citizenry, reform was to be achieved by "a careful and scientific
adjustment of the machinery of government for the correction of
prevalent evils."3 Progressives pushed such reforms as initiative, recall, referendum, and frequent elections in the belief that these
measures would provide closer voter supervision of elected officials.
In addition, great emphasis was placed on reforming the ballot in
order "to concentrate the attention of the electorate on the selection
of a much smaller number of officials and so afford to the voters the
opportunity of exercising more discrimination in their use of the
franchise." 4 The principal thrust in this area was the "short ballot"
movement, which advocated a reduction in the number of elective
offices. 5 But the "short ballot" concept, with its underlying premise
that reasoned choice was enhanced by reducing the number of choices
to be made, also gave rise to restrictions on the number of candidates
running for a given office. How better to restrict the number of candidates and to weed out the frivolous than to require the payment of
a fee as a condition to appearance on the ballot? Thus was born the
candidates' filing fee.
The Progressive movement died with America's entry into the
First World War,6 but not before several state legislatures had been
prompted to enact filing fees. 7 After the War the belief that political
1. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 173 (1955).
2. Id. at 173-84.
3. S. RussELL, PROGRESSIVE PoLm~ 33 (1914). The idea of structural reforms was
perhaps most graphically expressed in a speech by an opponent of these reforms, Chief
Justice Taft:
With our genius for machinery, and a forced analogy from the strides we have
made in labor-saving devices and in reducing the cost of production, we seem to
think that all we need in order to create a government of the highest efficiency
and morality and usefulness, is to discover some patent device to do this, without
any special effort at improving the individuals who are its members.
Address by (later) Chief Justice Taft, Fifteenth Annual Dinner of the Pennsylvania
Society, Dec. 13, 1913.
4. H. CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 289 (1914).
5. See E. BULLOCK, SHORT BALLOT (1915).
6. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 273.
7. See, e.g., Ch. 4, § 45, [1893] Minn. Laws 27-28: Ch. 241, § 1, [1903] Tenn. Acts
553; Ch. 66, § 5, [1905] Neb. Laws 327; Ch. 109, § 4, [1905] N.D. Laws 208; Ch. 139, § 8,
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responsibility could be greatly increased by structural reform of the
electoral system continued to hold sway. In 1930, for instance, the
National Municipal League published "A Model Election Administration System" that carried fonvard the notion that restrictions
should be placed on candidates to reduce the size of the ballot.8 One
of the restrictions proposed by the model act was "to require a substantial filing fee of each candidate, with provision that any candidate
who receives a fair vote will have the fee refunded to him.'' 9
Apparently a majority of the states still share the League's concern. All but fifteen10 have some provision dealing with the payment
of filing fees. The continuing vitality of this concern is demonstrated
by the fact that several legislatures have only recently approved the
imposition of such fees. 11 These restrictions are_ not without their
detractors. Indeed, filing fees have increasingly come under fire
as prevailing values of the nation have changed. Whereas the Progressives were concerned with restricting the ballot to achieve voting
rationality, the dominant theme of recent electoral reforms has been
toward increased access to the ballot.12 The result has been a conflict
between the Progressive ideals as embodied in the filing fee systems
and the growing restiveness of many in our society with any alleged
restrictions on essential rights. Not surprisingly this conflict has been
translated into constitutional litigation.
II.

FILING FEES AND AssESSMENTS

. Schemes for filing fees are rich in their variation.13 All basically
entail an assessment which, when paid by a candidate, entitles him
[1907] S.D. Laws 290-91; Ch. 209, § 5, [1907] Wash. Laws 458; Ch. 404, § 7, [1909] Cal.
Stat. 696; Ch. 124, § 7, [1915] Ore. Laws 126.
8, One of the principal causes of our long ballot is that many persons, for one
motive or another, run for office, though they have no expectation of being elected.
Sometimes it is the crank; sometimes it is the young lawyer or business man who
wishes to avail himself of free advertising. In many communities the same persons
run for office over and over again without the least expectation of being elected.
It is a sad commentary upon our elections that occasionally an unheard-of person
is elected to a high office. Some means should be taken to prevent the ballot from
being cluttered up with the names of persons who are advertisers or cranks.
Harris, A Model Election Administration System, 19 NATL, MuN. REv. 629, 659 (1930).
9. Id. at 659. The National Municipal League also envisioned the possibility of
using petitions as a threshold measure but preferred fees since it was felt that petitions
were too easily obtained because of the public's willingness to sign anything.
10. Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Wisc~nsin.
11. See, e.g., Ch. 241, § 4, [1969] Del. Laws 57; No. 1079, § 34-1013, [1970] Ga. Laws
366; Tit. 26, Ch. 5b, [1959] Okla. Laws 120. Texas recently amended its fee system to
conform with the holding in Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970), afjd.
sub nom. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972) (discussed in pt. III.
infra). See Ch. 11, § I, [1971] Tex. Laws 3443.
12. See U.S. CONST. amends. XXV (poll taxes) &: XXVI (eighteen-year old vote);
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970).
13. The statutes are compiled in Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees
for Political Candidates, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 136-41 (1971).
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to.have 'his name printed on the ba11ot;H but in implementing this
general requirement distinctive provisions abound. It is precisely
these differences that the courts have seized upon to distinguish
between valid and invalid schemes.
The first major distinction benveen various types of filing fees
lies in the scope of their applicability. Some filing schemes apply only
to those candidates running in primary elections. Other schemes
enjoy general applicability; they require that all candidates pay the
assessment. 11s Judged on this criterion, the states with filing fees are
almost evenly divided. Fourteen states have fees that apply to candidates in general elections,16 while the remainder of those having fee
systems apply them only to primary elections.17
Filing fees systems can also be differentiated on the basis of who
collects the fees and for what purposes the fees are used. In five states
where the fees are required for candidates in primary elections, the
fees are paid to and utilized by the party in whose primary the candidate chooses to run.18 In three other states the fees are split between
the party and the state.10 The remainder of the states provide that
the payment be made to some state or local official.20 Most of these
14. There are frequently other requirements that must be met in addition to the
payment of a filing fee. They range from the signing of a declaration of candidacy to
the somewhat more burdensome requirement of circulating a nominating petition.
15. Under this heading are included the fee systems of states that make entry into
the primary election mandatory for all general election candidates.
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-120 (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092 (Supp. 1971);
HAWAII REV. LAWS§ 13-16 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 34-608 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN,
§ 202.05 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 3120 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REV, STAT. § 32-504 (1968):
Omo REV. CooE ANN. § 3513.I0 (Baldwin 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 161 (Supp.
1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2914 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-3-14 (1953); WASH,
REV. CODE ANN. § 29.18.050 (1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5·8 (1966); WYO. STAT, ANN,
§ 22-118.16 (Supp. 1971).
17. ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 347 (1958); ALASKA STAT, § 15.25.050 (1971); CAL, ELECTIONS
CODE § 6552 (West Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400 (Supp. 1971); DEL,
ConE ANN. tit. 15, § 3104 (Supp. 1970); GA. CooE ANN. § 34-1013 (1970); KAN, STAT,
ANN. § 25-206 (Supp. 1970); KY. REV. STAT. § 119.250 (1962); LA. REV. ANN. § 18:314
(West 1969); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4A-6 (1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1163 (Supp,
1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 120.350 (Supp. 1971); MoNT. REV. CooES ANN. § 23·3304
(Supp. 1971): NEv. REV. STAT. § 293.193 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT, ANN. § 56:14 (1970);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-26 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-107 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV,
STAT. § 249.271 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.74 (Supp. 1970); TEX. ELECTION CODE
art. 13.07 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-198 (Supp. 1971).
18. ALA. CooE tit. 17, § 347 (1958); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 3104, 3107 (Supp.
1970); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 3120 (Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 120.350 (Supp. 1971);
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 23-400.74 (Supp. 1970).
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-109, -120 (Supp. 1969) (a fixed candidate fee is required
of all candidates; in addition party candidates must pay a ballot fee set by the
party); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092 (Supp. 1971) (a fee of 3% of the annual salary of
the office is to be paid to the state, and an assessment of 2% to the party); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18.310-.3ll (West 1969) ($100 is to be paid to the state for all candidates,
and up to $500 to the party, ,depending on party assessments).
20. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400 (Supp. 1971) (secretary of state);
KY. REv. STAT. § 119.250 (1962) (county clerk).
·
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states put the fees into the general operating fund,21 although in five
states the fees are earmarked for payment of governmental election
expenses.22
Still a third way of distinguishing the various fee systems is by
the amount of the fee. Thirteen states set the fee for major offices
at a percentage of the salary; 23 such fees vary from one fourth of one
per cent24 to six per cent25 of the annual salary. In four states the
fees are set by the political party within a dollar limit established
by statute.26 The remaining states require a fixed fee, the amount
paid varying with the office. The maximum fees in these states range
from one27 to fifteen hundred dollars.28
The final characteristic of a fee system relevant to constitutional
analysis is its force as an absolute requirement for appearance on the
ballot. At the present time the majority of states impose mandatory
fees on all candidates in the election. Only seven states provide alternative methods of reaching the ballot that do not require payment
of a fee. 20
The differences in the internal structure of fee systems might
suggest that legal generalizations on the validity of fee systems would
be misplaced. Indeed, a series of federal cases have held some of the
above distinctions to be of constitutional import. Whether these
holdings are consistent with constitutional theory is a question open
to considerable doubt. 30
21. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2914 (1963);

w. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 3-5-8 (1966).

22. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 6556 (West Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-107
(Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 161 (Supp. 1971); TEX. ELECTION CODE art.
13.o7a (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-198 (Supp. 1971).
23. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 6552 (West Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400
(Supp. 1971): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-206 (Supp.
1970); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 23-3304 (Supp. 1971): NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-513
(1968): N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-26 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-107 (Supp. 1971): Omo
REv. STAT. ANN. § 3513.10 (Baldwin 1971): UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-3-14 (1953); VA.
CODE ANN. § 24,1-198 (Supp. 1971); WASH, REV. CODE ANN. § 29.18.050 (1965); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-8 (1966).
24. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 20-3-14 (1953).
25. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-26 (1970).
26, ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 347 (1958); DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3104 (Supp. 1970);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:311 (West 1969): S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.74 (Supp. 1970).
27. KY. REV. STAT. § 119.250 (1962).
28. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 161 (Supp. 1971).
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400_ (Supp. 1971) (petition): KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-206
(Supp. 1970) (petition); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1163 (Supp. 1971) (petition); N.H. fuv.
STAT. ANN. § 56:11 (1971) (petition): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 161 (Supp. 1971)
(petition); ORE. REV. STAT, § 249.220 (1967) (petition): TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 13.07a
(Supp. 1971) (petition and pauper's affidavit).
30. See pt. IV. infra.

562

Michigan Law Review
III. THE

[Vol, '10:558

LEGAL HISTORY OF FILING FEES

The first cases to challenge filing fees arose in state courts; they
were based primarily on alleged violations of state constitutions.81
Since few courts dealt with the same arguments, no discernible pattern emerged from these cases.32 Of more importance have been the
recent attacks on filing fees based on federal grounds. The first of
these was Jenness v. Little,33 a declaratory judgment action that
sought to invalidate an Atlanta city ordinance imposing a mandatory
filing fee on all candidates in municipal elections.84 The court limited
its consideration to the claims of a candidate for alderman who
alleged that the ordinance violated her rights under the due process,
freedom of assembly, and equal protection clauses of the Federal
Constitution.35 Basing its decision on the poll tax cases,80 the court
held that "to prohibit candidates from getting their names on the
ballot solely because they cannot post a certain amount of money is
illegal and unconstitutional."37 It refused, however, to hold the fees
unconstitutional per se, stating that if "the candidate can get his
31. For discussion of several of these state cases, see Annot., 89 A.L.R,2d 864 (1963).
32. E.g., Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, llO N.E. 98'1 (1916) (fee unconstitutional
because not related to services rendered to the candidate by the state): State ex rel.
Thompson v. Scott, 99 Minn. 145, 108 N.W. 828 (1906) (fee constitutional because
the amount so low as to impose no hardship on any prospective candidate): State ex rel.
Neu v. Waechter, 332 Mo. 574, 58 S.W.2d 971 {1933) {fee unconstitutional because of state
constitutional provision for free elections); State ex rel, Riggle v. Brodigan, 37 Nev.
492, 143 P. 238 (1913) (fee not unconstitutionally excessive because it was not as
much as campaign expenditures); Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N.D. 363, 113
N.W. 1071 (1907) (fee unconstitutional because it forced voters to pay a fee to enter
a candidate of their choice); Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 122 Tenn. 570, 125 S.W. 1036
(1909) (fee unconstitutional as creating an arbitrary and oppressive classification),
33. 306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Matthews v.
Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970), discussed in Case Comment, 18 J. Pun. L. 483 (1969).
34. The fee schedule was as follows: for mayor, $1000; for vice mayor, $600; for
alderman, $500; for school board member, $400. See 306 F. Supp. at 927.
35. The suit was originally brought by Linda Jenness, a candidate for mayor,
to void a fee schedule enacted pursuant to a state statute (No. 229, § 3, [1969] Ga.
Laws 2522) amending the city charter to allow such fees. The candidate for alderman,
Ethel Mae Matthews, and a black voter and resident of Atlanta, Julie Shields,
intervened as co-plaintiffs alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional and
violated § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970}, The court
found for the plaintiffs on the statutory ground and voided the ordinance. The city
then enacted the ordinance involved in this case. Jenness did not press her claims
against the new ordinance, but Matthews and Shields amended their complaints to
challenge it. The court did not deal with the claims of the voter, Shields, stating
that its holding on the rights of the candidate, Matthews, was substantially determina•
tive of all of the issues in the case. 306 F. Supp. at 927. The court also dealt with
the allegations under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, finding them baseless.
306 F. Supp. at 928.
36. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
37. 306 F. Supp. at 929. The court's holding applied only to future elections
since it was felt that enjoining the fee for the current election would leave the city
with no way to regulate the ballot. 306 F. Supp. at 929.
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name on the ballot in some other fashion, either by nominating
petition, primary, or pauper's affidavit,'' 38 the city ,vould he permitted to continue the fees.
From the Jenness decision, it seemed clear that fees would be
struck down unless an alternative method of getting on the ballot
was provided. But this seemingly clear conclusion was severely
qualified in the next case dealing with filing fees, Wetherington v.
Adams.39 The plaintiff, a candidate for the state legislature, sought
to void a Florida statute imposing a mandatory filing fee on all
those seeking a party nomination through a primary election.40 The
plaintiff contended that fees were an unconstitutional denial of his
rights to due process and equal protection.41 In disposing of the
due process claim the court cited Snowden v. Hughes 42 for the
proposition that " 'an unlawful denial by state action of a right to
state political office is not a denial of a right of property or of liberty secured by the due process clause.' " 43 The equal protection argument, the court held, was to be resolved according to the Supreme
Court's formulation in Williams v. Rhodes: 44
"In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind
the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and
interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification."45
Using this formulation, the Wetherington court found that the filing
fees were justified by the state's interests in keeping elections to a
manageable size, in limiting the ballot to only serious candidates,
and in strengthening the political parties.46 These interests were
clearly predominant since whatever disadvantage the fees caused a
candidate were largely offset by a statute allowing the voter to write
in the name of any candidate not on the ballot.47 Jenness was noted
and distinguished with the statement that
38. 306 F. Supp. at 929.
39. 309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
40. The fee was 5% of the annual salary, with 2% going to the party and 3%
going to the state. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092 (Supp. 1971).
41. Plaintiff also contended that, if not unconstitutional per se, then the particular
fees applying to him were unconstitutional as excessive. This contention was not,
however, pressed in oral argument and the court treated it only in passing. 309 F.
Supp. at 320.
42. 321 U.S. l (1943). For further discussion of Snowden, see pt. IV. B. infra.
43. 309 F. Supp. 318, 320 (N.D. Fla. 1970), quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1, 7 (1943).
44. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For further discussion of Williams, see text accompanying
notes 103-05 infra.
45. 309 F. Supp. at 321, quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
46. 309 F. Supp. at 321.
47. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.011 (2) (Supp. 1971).
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[t]here are factual differences between this case, and that one, which
may be ground for differentiation between them. Be that as it may,
this Court holds the prohibition here involved against candidates
who do not pay the fees in question having their names on the ballot
is legal and constitutional.4B
The Wetherington court's handling of Jenness did little to clarify
the apparent inconsistencies between the holdings. Thus, when the
Jenness court was presented with another filing fee case in Georgia
Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson,40 it felt constrained to reconcile
the decisions. Fortson involved an attack on another Georgia statute,
which imposed on all general election candidates a filing fee equal
to five per cent of the annual salary of the office. 50 The court did not
specifically deal with any of the claims advanced by the plaintiffs, 51
but instead simply stated that Jenness was controlling. The main
portion of the opinion attempted to reconcile Jenness and Wetherington. The distinction was that the former dealt with independent
candidates in general elections while the latter dealt with regular
party candidates in primary elections. 52 Yet the court did not appear
totally satisfied with this distinction. It criticized the argument in
Wetherington that serious candidates can raise the fee through campaign funding, stating:
[W]hile as the Wetherington court says, it may be true that serious
candidates traditionally attract money for their candidacy, we cannot
say as a matter of law that one's candidacy is not serious or that he
does not have the right to run merely because he does not have or has
thus far failed to attract a certain amount of money.53
This caveat suggested that the views of the two courts were not
completely reconcilable, a suggestion that was strengthened by another three-judge panel sitting in Fowler v. Adams. 54 In this case, a
48. 309 F. Supp. at 322.
49. 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970), afjd. on other grounds sub nom. Jenness v,
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
50. No. 1079, § 34-1013, [1970] Ga. Laws 366-68. The suit also involved the
constitutionality of GA. ConE ANN. § 34-1001 (Supp. 1970), which sets petition
requirements for candidates other than those nominated by the major political parties.
The statute requires minor party and independent candidates to submit petitions
signed by 5% of the eligible voters to get on the general election ballot, Major
party candidates do not have to submit petitions. The court upheld these require•
ments, and the Supreme Court affirmed, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). Inasmuch as the filing
fee requirements were not considered by the Court on appeal, it will be necessary
to deal with only the lower court's holding on that issue.
51. The plaintiffs, voters and candidates for governor and Congress, had alleged
violations of equal protection and first amendment rights to vote, run for office,
and petition for grievance. 315 F. Supp. at 1037.
52. 315 F. Supp. at 1041.
53. 315 F. Supp. at 1041.
54. 315 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla.), injunction granted, 400 U.S. 1205 (1970), appeal
dismissed, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). The appeal was initially handled by Justice Black as
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candidate for the Republican nomination for a seat· in· the United
States House of Representatives sought to void the same Florida
statute that had been upheld in Wetherington. 56 He argued that the
statute, in addition to violating equal protection, added requirements66 for congressional candidates other than those found in article
I, section 2, clause 2, of the Constitution. 67 Dealing first with the
article I argument, the court denied plaintiff's claim on the ground
that such fees were merely an exercise of the state's power to regulate
the manner of holding elections set forth in article I, section 4,
clause 1 of the Constitution. 58 As for the equal protection argument,
the court cited as controlling the Wetherington holding that the
state's interest in imposing the fees outweighed any harm to the
candidate. 69 The contrary decisions were distinguished on tangential issues rather than on their merits. Jenness, for example, was
distinguished on the ground that the case had later been found
Circuit Justice, who stated that "[t]he case raises questions which make it impossible
for me to predict with certainty what the majority of this Court would decide."
400 U.S. at 1206. In view of his uncertainty on the merits, Justice Black ordered
Fowler's name placed on the ballot on the equitable ground that, while this order
caused the state little injury, a failure to do so would irreparably damage Fowler.
It is unclear what issues in particular troubled Justice Black since the case
involved both article I and equal protection claims. In his opinion he spent more
time with the former but noted the discrepancy between this case and Fortson.
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99-092 (Supp. 1971).
56. The "added qualifications" argument has often been made in state courts.
Although not dealing with filing fees as a qualification, several of the state courts
have held other restrictions unconstitutional as adding to the qualifications in the
federal constitution. See, e.g., Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149, 44 N.W.2d
484 (1950) (conviction of a felony); Shub v. Simpson, 80 N.J.L. 193, 76 A.2d 332
(1950) (requirement that candidate file affidavit that he is not a subversive person);
State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968) (requirement that
candidate be a resident and qualified elector of district from which he is running);
State ex rel. Sundfor v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246, 6 N.W.2d 89 (1942) (prohibition of
defeated primary candidate from running in general election); Ekwall v. Stadelman,
146 Ore. 439, 30 P.2d 1037 (1934) (prior oath by judge that he would accept no other
nonjudicial office during his term); State v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 864 (1948)
(state constitutional provision that governor not eligible for any other elective office
during his term). Contra, Holley v. Adams, 238 S.2d 401 (Fla. 1970) (statute providing
that current officeholders may not run for other concurrent offices acceptable since
the candidate may give up his current office); Secretary of State v. McGucken, 244
Md. 70, 222 A.2d 693 (1966) (requirement that candidate appoint a campaign
treasurer). Federal courts have not dealt with this argument, although it seems
likely that they will view the provisions as restrictively as state courts. Cf. Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
57. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, states: "No person shall be a Representative who
shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five years, and been seven Years a
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of
the State in which he shall be chosen."
58. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, provides: "The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators."
·
·
59. 315 F. Supp. at 593-94. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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moot on appeal to the Supreme Court. 60 Fortson was held inapplicable since that court had specifically distinguished Wetherington, a
case which the present court found controlling. The shallowness of
this reasoning was apparent even to the court, however, since it felt
constrained to follow the Fortson court's example and disagree with
the supposedly distinguished decisions. Thus, the Fowler court stated:
Nor may ... [plaintiff] ... rely on Harper v. Virginia State Board
of Elections .... Permitting candidates to qualify in unlimited number simply upon meeting age, residence and citizenship requirements
is calculated by sheer unwieldly weight of numbers of names to lead
to a breakdown of the election process and destroy the free right of
suffrage which Harper champions. At least, there is some guarantee
of serious intentions when a candidate or his supporters pay a
qualifying fee. We think Harper may not be so applied, despite the
contrary views of the Jenness court.61
Although Fowler and Fortson accepted the primary-general election
distinction, both courts appeared to recognize that in reality it was
merely a method of superficially reconciling fundamentally conflicting cases. Furthermore, neither opinion offered any precedent or
policy support for the distinction. This gap in analysis was quite evident in Thomas v. Mims, 62 the next case to deal with the filing fee
issue.
In Thomas a candidate for the Mobile Board of Commissioners
sought to invalidate an Alabama statute that imposed a mandatory
filing fee on all those running in the municipal general election. 03
The plaintiff contended that the statute denied her rights to vote
and to seek office in violation of due process and equal protection.
The court disposed of her due process claim by citing the Snowden° 4
holding that the right to state office was a state created, not a federally
created, right. In dealing with the equal protection argument, the
court said: "The state must demonstrate not merely a reasonable
justification for the distinction it draws between its citizens, it must
show a compelling state interest." 65 The court then examined the
asserted state interests in defraying the costs of the election, in ensuring that only serious candidates are on the ballot, and in control60. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). It is not clear how the Fowler court
concluded that the Supreme Court's decision invalidated the lower court decision in
Jenness. The Matthews decision merely stated that, since the election had taken place
between Jenness and the appeal, the case was moot. 397 U.S. at 94. The merits of
the case were not discussed, so it appears that the decision of the lower court was
left intact.
61. 315 F. Supp. at 596 (emphasis original).
62. 317 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
63. No. 287, § 3, [1965 Spec. SC§S] Ala. Laws 395.
64. 321 U.S. 1 (1943), discussed in pt. IV. B. infra.
65. 317 F. Supp. at 181 (emphasis original).

January 1972]

Notes

567

ling ballot size. Although these interests were essentially the same
as those accepted to justify the fees in Wetherington, 66 the Thomas
court struck down the fees. 67 Yet, in the face of what appeared to be
a fundamental inconsistency on this common issue and without offering any support for the distinction, the Thomas court concluded that
Wetherington "is distinguishable because the fee involved there was
for party primary elections. " 68
Although not logically consistent in many respects the five cases
from Jenness through Thomas were at least unanimous in their
agreement that filing fees are normally constitutional for primary
elections, but are constitutional for general elections only if an
alternative method of getting on the ballot is provided. But almost
as quickly as this latter generalization emerged, it was qualified by
the case of Carter v. Dies. 69
Under attack in Carter was a Texas statute that required candidates to pay a flat fee of fifty dollars plus their pro rata share of the
costs of the election in order to get on the primary ballot.70 The suit
was initiated by various candidates for county office, but at trial the
court allowed several voters to intervene as plaintiffs. As amended,
the complaint alleged that the fees violated the due process and equal
protection clauses by denying the plaintiffs and intervenors, respectively, their rights to run for office and to vote for candidates of their
choice. In its decision, however, the court dealt exclusively with the
rights of the intervenor voters. 71 The court found that the fees, by
keeping poor candidates off the ballot, seriously impaired a citizen's
ability to vote effectively.72 Because of this impairment, it was held
that the fees could be justified under the equal protection clause only
if they were necessary to the accomplishment of some compelling state
interest. The court noted that the Texas fee system had previously
been held to be a revenue generating mechanism.73 Relying on the
66. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
67. Thomas suggested, as had Jenness, that a filing fee might be permissible
if it were a part of a system that allowed a candidate to " 'get his name on the ballot
in some other fashion, either by nominating petition, primary election, or pauper's
affidavit.'" 317 F. Supp. at 182, quoting Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 929 (N.D.
Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970).
68. 317 F. Supp. at 182.
69. 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. sub nom. Bullock v. Carter, 40
U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972).
70. Ch. 492, § 186, [1951] Tex. Laws 1168-69 (now TEX. ELECTION ConE art. 13.07
(Supp. 1971)). The assessment of costs often involved substantial sums. For example,
the costs assessed against plaintiff candidate for county judge amounted to $6300.
321 F. Supp. at 1360.
71. "Since the rights of the intervenors as voters will be determinative of the
constitutionality of the laws here attacked, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the
rights of the candidates." 321 F. Supp. at 1360.
72. 321 F. Supp. at 1361.
73. 321 F. Supp. at 1361, citing Campbell v. Davenport, 362 F.2d 624 (5th Cir.
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poll tax cases, the court concluded that the state's interest in raising
revenue was not sufficient to justify the infringement on the right to
vote, and the filing fees were therefore declared unconstitutional.74
The Carter court attempted to reconcile the prior federal cases
involving filing fees. The effort instead resulted in yet another demonstration of the basic inconsistencies among the various decisions.
First, the court limited its holding by stating:
The Court does not mean to imply that there is no compelling interest, pursuant to which the State may require a primary filing fee.
We have limited our decision here to say that a filing fee violates the
First Amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment when it is used as a revenue collecting
device or when made an absolute qualification in order for a candidate to get his name on the ballot. Indeed, there may be other compelling interests which would justify some type of reasonable fee. 76

The court went on to distinguish Wetherington by saying:
The plaintiff in that case was a candidate and the issues were decided
on the basis of what were his rights vis-a-vis those of the state. While
neither approving nor disapproving of the reasoning used or the
results reached, we need only say that in the case at bar we have
resolved the issues on the rights of the voters. The cases are, there.fore, distinguishable.10

It is not at all clear that the court was persuaded of its own logic.
It may have simply been looking for a way to void fees in a primary
election without directly contradicting Wetherington. Or it may have
been reacting to an isolated situation presented by the Texas statute.77
This latter interpretation was reinforced on appeal by a unanimous Supreme Court, which seized upon the "salient features" of
1966). The question in Campbell was whether the costs assessed under the statute
were regulatory or merely another form of state tax, the latter being deductible
for federal income tax purposes. The Campbell court found the assessment to be a tax:
The persuasive factor in reaching our conclusion is the size of the primary
assessment in Texas. A fee of $100 or even $500 might be explainable primarily
in terms of regulation. But it strains our imagination to accept the Commissioner's
argument that an assessment of some $2000 is primarily for the purpose of
regulation. The most reasonable explanation of the size of the assessment is to
raise revenue to cover the cost of the primary.
362 F.2d at 629. Contra, McLean v. Durham County Bd. of Elections, 222 N.C. 6,
21 S.E.2d 842 (1942).
74. 321 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
75. 321 F. Supp. at 1362.
76. 321 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
77. This explanation is supported by Judge Thornberry's concurring opinion in
Carter. 321 F. Supp. at 1363. He pointed out that the fees were several times higher
than those dealt with by other courts and thus posed a proportionately greater
disadvantage to poor candidates.
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the Texas system in affirming the district court.78 Following the
lead of the lower court, the Supreme Court placed its emphasis
upon the fees as restrictions on the voters' rights:
Unlike a filing fee requirement which most candidates could be expected to fulfill from their own resources or at least through moderate contributions, the very size of the fees imposed under the Texas
system gives it a patently exclusionary character.... To the extent
that the system requires candidates to rely on contributions from
voters in order to pay the assessments, a phenomenon which can
hardly be rare in light of the size of the fees, it tends to deny some
voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their cl1oosing ....79
In light of the harm caused the voters, the Court concluded that a
strict scrutiny of the fees and the state interests offered to justify
them would be required.
Under this standard the Court could not deem the fees necessary to the regulation of the ballot or to the production of revenueinterests which the Court nonetheless acknowledged as legitimate. 80
Once again it was the excessive character of the fees that concerned
the Court: such fees did not effectively promote the goal of limiting the ballot to serious candidates since legitimate candidates might
well be unable to meet the assessment. Similarly, the Court was
unwilling to accept the proposition that filing fees were necessary
to the financing scheme of primary elections. On the basis of this
analysis the Supreme Court concluded that the Texas fee system
violated the equal protection clause, although its holding was
couched in more guarded terms than that of the district court.
·whereas the lower court decision maintained that filing fees would
be unconstitutional when used as a revenue measure or when made
an absolute requirement with no alternative means of access to the
ballot, the Supreme Court simply noted that the Texas scheme suffered from both flaws. More importantly, the Court cautioned that
its decision was not intended to reflect upon the validity of reasonable filing fees. 81
Because of its limitations, Carter leaves many questions unresolved. Jenness, Fortson, and Thomas had taken the position that
filing fees were unconstitutional unless a reasonable alternative was
provided.82 In light of Carter, will a fee that is excessive in amount
be invalid despite the availability of an alternative route to the ballot? Conversely, will a fee that is reasonable in amount be valid
78. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), afjg. Carter v. Dies, 321
F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
79. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4214.
80. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4214, 4216.
81. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4216.
82. See also Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 334 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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despite the ·lack of an alternative, as apparently was suggested in
TVelh_{:_:,:ington and Fowler? 83 Or will a fee only be struck down when
it is unreasonable in amount and when no alternative access is available? But perhaps the most important question left unresolved by
Carter is whether ariy fee system regardless of its provisions should
be valid. Underlying the latter question is the fundamental conflict
between the Progressive legacy of ballot restriction and the present
demand for increased access to the ballot. A resolution of this conflict
can no longer be avoided.

IV. THE

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Three claims recurred frequently in the filing fee cases: excessiveness of the fee, lack of due process, and violation of equal protection.
The first two were not extensively discussed by most of the courts;
it was the third claim that occupied the attention of the courts and
served as the basis for the most significant differences of opinion.
Much of this section will therefore be devoted to the equal protection
argument in an attempt to resolve the inconsistencies that have arisen
in the recent cases.
Because there is considerable variation among the filing fee systems in various states, a survey that sought to analyze these distinctions
in every context would be needlessly confusing. In the discussion
that follows, the focus of analysis will instead be on a hypothetical or
model fee system. The significance of the variations from this model
will be postponed until this analysis is complete. In this model the
term "filing fee" will be used to describe a mandatory system of fees
for all general election candidates. It will be assumed that the amount
of the fee is three per cent of the annual salary for the office. The
fees, under this model, will be paid to a state official and deposited in
the general operating fund. This hypothetical system, it should be
noted, is simply a combination of the most widely adopted characteristics of present fee systems. It should therefore provide the most convenient method for the general analysis of the constitutionality of the
fees.
83. See also Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971). Spillers involved
another attack on the Florida statute upheld in Wetherington. Unlike other cases,
however, the plaintiffs included both prospective candidates and voters. Their complaint offered a new argument in opposition to filing fees. In addition to a violation
of equal protection, the plaintiffs alleged that fees denied their rights in "voting and
running for office [which] are expressions of free speech and association, and constitute
privileges and immunities which are secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution." 325 F. Supp. at 551. Neither the additional parties nor claims
were sufficient to induce the court to change the stance previously adopted. The court
summarily concluded that the privileges and immunities argument was covered by the
Snowden theory of state-created rights. See pt. JV. B. infra. As for the equal protection
argument, the court indicated the state interests recognized in Wetherington were
sufficient to outweigh any disadvantage to either voters or candidates. See 325 F. Supp.
at .552-53. The distrid .court decision in Carter and the poll tax cases were distinguished as applying only to fees imposed to raise revenue, 825 F. Supp. at 553.54,

January 1972]

·Notes

571

A.· Excessiveness
The argument that a filing fee is excessive is simply an ·argument
that the fee does not meet the court's standard for reasonableness.
Most of the plaintiffs pressed the argument as a backstop in the event
that they lost their argument that the fees were unconstitutional per
se.B 4 The argument initially met with little success. The only case in
which the argument was accepted was Carter, which dealt with the
exceptionally high Texas assessments.B 5 In the other cases the courts
were simply unwilling to hold that, as a matter of law, the amount of
the fees they were considering was excessive.B6
The problem lies not in the argument but rather in the reluctance
of the courts to be involved in setting precise doll~r limits on reasonableness. Indeed, though the fees examined in the federal cases were
all much higher than the three per cent figure used in the model,
only the Supreme Court in Carter was willing to find the fee excessive. Thus, although the argument may have theoretical validity, in
practice it may be quite difficult to convince a court that any fee is
excessive.

B. Due Process

In the filing fee cases the plaintiffs, whether candidates or voters,
almost uniformly asserted that the fees denied them a right secured
by the privileges and immunities or due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The courts were equally uniform in their response, relying on SnowdenB1 to dispose of the claim.BB Snowden involved allegations that the Canvassing Board of Cook County had
failed to place the plaintiff's name on the general election ballot even
though he had been duly nominated in the Republican primary. Because of the proportional representation plan then in effect in Illinois, an agreement between the parties had already assured the plaintiff the election. so The plaintiff therefore alleged that the action of the
84. For example, in Carter it was claimed that even if there were state interests
compelling enough to justify a fee, the particular fee involved was "exorbitant, arbitrary, capricious, irrelevant, unreasonable, outrageously high • • • [and] without any
reasonable relation to any legitimate legislative purpose." 321 F. Supp. at 1360.
85. See note 70 supra.
86. State courts that have considered this problem have seldom voided filing
fees as excessive. Several courts have, however, used the somewhat related standard
of arbitrariness to void them. These courts have held that the fee was not related
to any legislative purpose. It should be noted that few of these courts considered
ballot regulation as a permissible state objective. See Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173,
110 N.E. 987 (1916); State ex rel. Boomer v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 529, 97 P. 733 (1908);
People ex rel. Breackon v. Board of Election Commrs., 221 Ill. 9, 77 N.E. 321 (1906).
87. 321 U.S. 1 (1943).
88. See Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550, 552 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Thomas v.
Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179, 181 (N.D. Ala. 1970); Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592,
595 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 818, 320 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
89. The parties had agreed that two Republicans and one Democrat would be
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Board deprived him of his state office without due process. The Court
concluded that the right to state office was not protected by due process or the privileges and immunities clause since this right was an
incident of state rather than federal citizenship.00 The Court then
affirmed the judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action since "the right asserted by
the petitioner is not one secured by the Fourteenth Amendment." 01
Although Snowden has not been recently tested, it is apparently still
considered valid by the Court.02
Snowden is not, however, dispositive of all due process claims. A
different characterization of due process problems was accepted by
the court in Briscoe v. Kusper. 03 In that case twelve independent candidates for alderman alleged that the Chicago Board of Elections sustained objections to their nominating petitions without giving the
candidates an adequate chance to answer the charges. The court held
that their claims under the due process clause were sufficient to state
a cause of action:
[I]n this instance, we perceive the complaint of these candidates and
voters as transcending mere assertion of state created rights. The
thrust of their challenge .•. rests upon the effect which denial of
ballot placement has upon their enjoyment of rights of free association
and petition for the redress of grievances. For this reason, and because of the developments in the body of constitutional law dealing
with "political rights," we also conclude that Snowden v. Hughes
does not preempt consideration of plaintiffs' constitutional due process claims.04

The only court presented with this due process-rights of association argument in the filing fee context was Spillers v. Slaughter0 u and
it disposed of the argument by relying on Snowden. This holding in
Spillers is obviously at odds with Briscoe and therefore is open to serious doubt. A legitimate argument might well be made on the associanominated for the three seats in the district. Plaintiff had received the second highest
number of votes in the Republican primary. 321 U.S. at 3-5.
90. 321 U.S. at 6-7.
91. 321 U.S. at 13.
92. Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4214 n. 19 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972); Egan v.
City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514, 515 (1961).
93. 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1970).
94. 435 F.2d at 1053. The Briscoe court justified this approach by reference to a
statement made by the Court in a per curiam opinion, Egan v. City of Aurora, 365
U.S. 514, 514-15 (1961): "Insofar as any right claimed stems from petitioner's status
as mayor under Illinois law it is precluded from assertion here by Snowden v.
Hughes •••. But as we read the complaint, the rights which petitioner claims he
was deprived of are those that derive from the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly
the right of free speech and assembly."
95. 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971), discussed in note 83 supra.
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tion and petition issues, circumventing the Snowden decision. 96 It
should be recognized, however, that due process claims have not been
eagerly accepted by the courts. While it may be that the concept is beginning to breathe new life,97 it is nonetheless clear that under the current constitutional doctrine equal protection arguments are a more
readily accepted form of attack. More importantly, the equal protection rubric provides a means of resolving the real conflict between electoral simplicity and ballot access.
C. Equal Protection
If the courts have been unstinting in their determination to reconcile inconsistent positions on the filing fees, it may be more a function of a basic disagreement on the meaning of equal protection than
of intellectual deceit. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 98 carefully delineated the standards to be applied to statutory classifications alleged to be in violation of the equal protection
clause. Under traditional doctrine a statute is found to violate equal
protection only when it results in discrimination against a certain class
of people and the classification is not rationally related99 to any legitimate state policy. But the traditional standard gives way to a more
exacting test under special circumstances. Thus "[s]tatutory classifications which either are based upon certain 'suspect' criteria or affect
'fundamental rights' will be held to deny equal protection unless justified by a 'compelling' governmental interest."100 A stricter scrutiny
and a higher level of justification may be triggered then by the scheme
of classification or the interests involved. The Court has already concluded that classification based on wealth must be deemed "suspect."101 In the context of the poll tax cases the Court noted:
"Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to
96. A further limitation on Snowden might also be noted. It applies only to state
elections since it is based on the difference between federal and state citizenship. In
a case involving a federal office, it should be possible to state a cause of action under
due process without fear of a Snowden-type holding. But see Fowler v. Adams, 315
F. Supp. 592, 595 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
97. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
98. 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969).
99. Justice Harlan described the extent of the relationship required as follows:
A legislative measure will be found to deny equal protection only if "it is
without any reasonable basis and is therefore purely arbitrary." • • • It is not
enough that the measure results incidently "in some inequality," or that it
is not drawn with "mathematical nicety" ••• ; the statutory classification must
instead cause "different treatments ••• so disparate, relative to the difference in
classification, as to be wholly arbitrary."
394 U.S. at 662 (citations omitted).
100. 394 U.S. at 658.
101. See McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). But
cf, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1970), in which the Court refused to overturn on
equal protection grounds a California constitutional provision requiring all proposed low-
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participate intelligently in the electoral process." 102 It would be hard
to deny that the model filing fee system imposes a standard of wealth
on candidates since it requires the candidate to meet an assessment
in order to get on the ballot. It seems clear therefore that filing fees
create a classification based on a "suspect" criterion and should be
justified only by a countervailing and compelling state interest.
The same conclusion is reached if filing fees are viewed with respect to Harlan's second category, the impairment of a fundamental
right. Its applicability is perhaps best demonstrated by Williams v.
Rhodes,103 a case dealing with another restriction on candidates' access to the ballot. The plaintiffs, two independent parties, challenged
the validity of an Ohio statute that set up a petition procedure to be
followed by small independent parties desiring to place candidates
on the general ballot.104 In determining the proper equal protection
standard to apply, the Court found:
[T]he state laws place burdens on two different, although overlap•
ping, kinds of rights-the right of political beliefs, and the right of
qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their
votes effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our most
precious freedoms. We have repeatedly held that freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment..•. Similarly we have said
with reference to the right to vote: "No right is more precious in a
free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who
make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined • • . .''105
income housing projects to be submitted to a community referendum. The Court did not
apply the compelling interest test. It is unclear whether this case signals a retreat
from previous doctrine. The Court did not specifically deal with the question of
wealth as a suspect criterion; it may well be that the Court simply felt that no
classification based on wealth was created. In any event, the Court's past holdings
make it clear that such a classification is created when persons are unable to exercise
a public right because of an inability to pay. Since that is the type of question raised
by a filing fee, the Court would have to retreat much further than even a broad
reading of Valtierra would suggest,
102, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966),
103. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
104. No. 101, § 1, [1930] Ohio Laws 335 (now OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 3517,01 (Baldwin
1971)). The statute applied to any small party that did not receive 10% of the votes
cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. It required such parties to obtain
petitions signed by qualified voters equal to 15% of the total number of votes
cast in the preceding gubernatorial election in order to have their candidates listed
on the ballot.
105. 393 U.S. at 30-31 (1966) (footnotes omitted). The Court appears to be saying
that the stricter scrutiny is triggered by what Justice Harlan would classify as the
impairment of a fundamental right. In his dissent in Shapiro, however, Justice
Harlarr analyzed Williams in slightly more complex terms:
Analrsis is complicated when the statutory classification is grounded upon the
-exercise of a "fundamental" right. For then the statute may come within the first
b~3I!cl_l of _thi; "compellip.g inferest" d,oc.trine because exercise of the right Js
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The Williams decision thus sets out two "fundamental" rights that
may be violated by restricting candidate access to the ballot: the right
to associate and the right to vote. The concern here, as it was with
the "suspect" criterion standard, must be whether the model filing
fee system sufficiently impairs these rights to call for use of the "compelling interest" standard.
·
The right to "engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas"106 is guaranteed against state action by the first and fourteenth amendments. 107 To impose a filing fee is to create an obstacle
in the path of any party seeking to "advance" its "beliefs and ideas"
through the political system. A fee, by restricting the ballot to those
able to pay, would of necessity impair the right to associate since, as
recognized in Williams, "[t]he right to form a party for the advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kepf off the
ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes." 108
A fee system also impairs the right to vote by making an individual's vote less effective. 'While it may be that there is some psychological value in the mechanical act of voting, the courts have long recognized that the right to vote is of political value only if the vote has
an effect on the system. Thus in the reapportionment case of Reynolds v. Sims, 100 great emphasis was placed on ensuring that all voters
had an approximately equal voice in choosing their representatives.
As the Court in Carter pointed out,11° Reynolds was concerned with
the quantitative effectiveness of the vote. The effort was to ensure that
the extrinsic value of all votes was equal. Filing fees do not impinge
on the quantitative effectiveness of the vote since all votes are given
the same weight. They may, however, reduce the effectiveness of the
vote in a qualitative sense. Just as a vote is effective only if it carries
weight in the system, it is likewise effective only if it adequately reflects the individual's policy preferences. In other words, the system
must strive to ensure that a citizen's vote is intrinsically valuable to
him as an expression of his political choices. 111
deemed a "suspect" criterion and also within the second because the statute is
considered to affect the right by deterring its exercise. Williams v. Rhodes •••
is such a case insofar as the statutes involved both inhibited exercise of the
right of political association and drew distinctions based upon the way the right
was exercised.
·
· ·
394 U.S. at 660-61 n.9.
106. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
107. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
108. 393 U.S. at 31.
109. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
110. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4214.
111. The quality of the vote is in fact more than a matter of the intrinsic value
to the individual; it holds forth the prospect of systemic effect. As recent campaigns
have demonstrated, out of the mouth of the third-party or maverick. candidate may
grow political power.
·
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The Williams Court recognized this fact when it remarked that
"the right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only
for one of two parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for
a place on the ballot."112 To rephrase this passage in the context of
a filling fee, the right to vote is burdened if that vote may be cast only
for candidates who can afford a filing fee at a time when poorer candidates are clamoring for a place on the ballot. Unless a person can
find on the ballot a candidate who reflects to some extent his policy
preferences, it cannot be said that he is voting effectively. Although
this does not mean that every voter must find a candidate to his liking
on the ballot, it certainly requires that every voter have an equal opportunity to place a candidate of his choice on the ballot. This goal
is significantly impinged upon by fee systems such as our model. For
such a system to be effective, it must eliminate some poorer candidates who may reflect the attitudes of a significant portion of the
population. Since the result is seriously to reduce the intrinsic value
of a person's vote as well as to abridge the right of association, it
is incumbent upon the state to demonstrate the compelling interest
that it is championing under such a fee system. 113
In the federal cases on filing fees the courts recognized either implicitly or explicitly that a stricter scrutiny had been triggered by the
classifications and the rights involved. They did not, however, agree
on the exact standard that the state must meet under the stricter scrutiny. The three courts that upheld the fees, Wetherington, Fowler,
and Spillers, used a different standard from that used by the four
courts that struck down such fees. In none of the cases in the former
group was the "compelling interest" standard used. Instead ot the
"compelling interest'' test, this group used a test based on a passage
from Williams: "In determining whether or not a state law violates
the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be
protecting, and interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification."114 Relying on this passage, the three courts applied a traditional balancing test to determine which interests should prevail.
But the "compelling state interest" test involves much more than
ll2. 393 U.S. at 31.
ll3. This analysis was accepted in essence by the Court in Carter. The Court was
careful, however, to point out that the mere existence of a burden on the right to
vote does not of itself trigger the higher standard; one must look to the extent and
nature of the impact of the burden on the voter to determine whether strict scrutiny
is required. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4214. While the 3% fee posited in the model is perhaps
not as "patently exclusionary" as the Texas fee, it seems probable that it would be of
such a magnitude as to be beyond the reach of the personal resources of many poor
candidates. In any event, the distinction suggested by the Court between an inability
to pay and an unwillingness to pay is a dubious one. See text accompanying notes
123 &: 128-31 infra.
ll4. 393 U.S. at 30.
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a simple balancing of the equities. It initially requires that the end
that the state seeks to attain be of "compelling" importance. This
means more than a showing that the goal is a legitimate state concern;
it demands that the state show "pressing public necessity"1115 for the
achievement of the goal since "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."116 In
addition, the test requires that the state action be "necessary, and
not merely rationally related" to the accomplishment of that state
interest.117 Each of the courts that struck down a filing fee scheme
used this test. Moreover, the passage from the Supreme Court opinion
in Williams that was used by the three courts upholding fee systems
was taken out of context. The Williams court did not intend to say
that a simple balancing test was all that was needed, but instead
agreed with earlier cases by requiring that the state interest be "compelling. " 118
It seems clear that the different tests used by the courts had a
significant impact on the decisions. As a proper application of the
compelling interest test will demonstrate, the putative state interests
behind a filing fee cannot be deemed to outweigh the harm caused
to the voter and candidate.
a. Harm to the individual. Harm to the voter is difficult to measure. No adequate empirical measure exists to gauge the harm caused
by the failure of a voter to find his candidate on the ballot. The
Carter Court has nevertheless indicated that it is the harm to the
voter that provides the axis of analysis in the case of filing fees-although this constitutional harm is in fact a function of the harm
done to the would-be candidate. Ultimately then it is the effect of the
fees upon the candidate that must be assessed. Harm to the individual candidate can be examined from two perspectives. The first is
empirical. One can look to the available data on candidate financing
to establish whether the imposition of filing fees would truly disadvantage any candidates. The primary source of these data is information on the campaign expenditures of candidates for various offices.
From the available information on this subject, it appears that a three
per cent fee used in the model would constitute a very small percentage of the total campaign expenditures of most serious candidates. It
was estimated that the cost of running an effective campaign in 1970
would be $100,000 for the House of Representatives and $250,000
115. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
116. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944).
117. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 186 (1964). See also Bullock v. Carter, 40
U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), afjg. Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex.
1970).
118. In determining whether the State has power to place such unequal burdens
on minority groups where rights of this kind are at stake, the decisions of this
Court have consistently held that "only a compelling state interest in the
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for the Senafe.119 These estimates may in fact be somewhat low. Some
primary. campaign expenditures for races in major states were reportedly in excess of $1,000,000.120 Obviously these expenses are exceptional, but even in smaller states the campaign expenses for a
major office are not insignificant.121 Moreover, although the data are
not nearly as complete, it appears that a fee such as proposed by the
model would not be a very large part of campaign expenditures for
minor offices.122 One can safely conclude that such fees would be
rather inconsequential to the majority of those who seriously contemplate running for office.
Yet harm may, as stated above, be viewed from two perspectives.
While it may be true that from an empirical perspective filing fees
do not hinder the majority of candidates, it does not necessarily follow that the harm is insignificant from a constitutional perspective.
The validity of state action is not to be measured simply by the
usual impact on the average man but must also take into account the
impact on particular groups or individuals who are specially affected
by the state's act. When viewed from this perspective, there can be
little doubt that at least some indigent candidates are affected by
filing fee systems. One need only look to the plaintiffs in the fee cases
to find examples of individuals allegedly disadvantaged by such
schemes. There is, however, the troubling suggestion in Carter that
the Court may draw a distinction between the effect of a filing fee
upon those individuals who are unable to pay and those who are unwilling to pay. The distinction appears to rest on the premise that
an unwillingness to pay a fee reflects upon the candidate's seriousness,
a premise that is untenable for constitutional purposes. 123 A fee need
not completely obstruct a candidate; it is sufficient that it simply
create a disincentive to political candidacy.124 Either result would
produce constitutionally cognizable harm to the candidate and voter.
b. The state interests. The Progressive concern for voting rationregulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can
justif} limiting First Amendment freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963).
393 U.S. at 31.

ll9. TWENTIEl'H CENTURY FUND, ELECTING CONGRESS! THE FINANCIAL DILEllll\fA
8 (1970).
120. 28 CONG, Q. WEEKLY REP. 1672 (1970).
121. See Wall St. J., Sept 28, 1970, at I, col. 1.
• 122. Perhaps the best collection of studies in .this field is 2 CmZENS RESEARCH
FOUNDATION, STUDIES IN MONEY IN POLITICS (H. Alexander ed. 1970), Although these
studies are based on 1964-1966 elections, they support the general conclusion that a
3% filing fee . would not be a significant percentage of most candidates' election
expenses.
·· 123. See text accompanying notes 128-31 infra.
124. The effect of a fee would be most strongly felt on the level of local elective
offices. Even a relatively modest fee might dissuade an othenvise serious candidate
from ,seeking office, particularly if qther political factors already weigh against him,
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ality, as reflected in the fees, focused on the interests of the majority
rather than of the individual. That is, the Progressives believed that
the interests of the majority should be preserved by an electoral system that was understandable by and responsive to the citizenry. If this
meant that certain groups or individuals were denied access, the Progressives felt justified in that they were merely protecting the democratic idea of majority rule.
Viewed from this vantage point, the equal protection issue turns
on whether the state's and therefore the majority's interests are to
be given precedence over those of the individual. Three state interests have been advanced to justify the imposition of filing fees: (1)to raise revenue to defray the costs of staging the election; (2) to limit
the ballot to serious candidates; and (3) to control ballot size.
The argument early raised in defense of filing fees was that of
revenue production. Analogizing the fee to user taxes,125 the state
claimed that it was only proper that the candidates pay part of the
cost of the election that was staged for their benefit. Some early state
court cases adopted this argument. 126 Under the "compelling interest" test, however, the argument is quite inadequate. The reason was
well stated by the lower court in Carter: "The collection of revenue
is, of course, a permissible and legitimate interest but under these
circumstances not a compelling state interest. These assessments are
not necessary to insure the collection of revenue." 127
A second state interest that the fees allegedly serve is that of limiting the ballot to serious candidates. The underlying premise of this
argument is that a "serious candidate for public office has traditionally attracted money for his candidacy. The inability to pay a reasonable filing fee might indicate lack of potential political support for
a person's candidacy."128 The empirical data available appear to support this conclusion. One of the leading authorities on the subject
of campaign financing has written:
The necessity for obtaining essential election funds has its most
profound importance in the choosing of candidates. The monies can
usually be assured, and often can be withheld, by a relatively small
corps of political specialists whose job it is to raise money. If the
125. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1742 (1970), which provides that the proceeds of federal
taxes on avialion fuel and air transportation shall be used solely for the improvement
of the nation's airways.
126. See Munsel v. Hennegan, 182 Md. 15, 31 A.2d 640 (1943): Riter v. Douglas,
32 Nev. 400, 109 P. 444 (1910). The strength of this argument is shown hy the fact
that some courts struck down fees lhal lhey fell were not directed loward raising
revenue. Cf. Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.E. 987 (1916); Johnson v. Grand Forks
Counly, 16 N.D. 363, 113 N.\V. 1071 (1907).
127. 321 F. Supp. at 1361. On appeal, the Supn·me Court sprcilically rejected lhe
argument lhat lhe candidales should "pay lhal share of lhe cost \\hi<.11 lhey have
occasioned." 40 U.S.L.W. al 4215.
1_28. W~therington v. Adams, _309 F. SUPP.· 318, ~2!_ (N.D •. Fla. l!l}O)~
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prospective candidate cannot get assurances of the support necessary
to meet the basic costs of a campaign, he may as well abandon hope
of winning. 129
But this argument, like the revenue argument before it, misses the
mark. It is an attempt to equate success with seriousness, a connection which, at least in constitutional thought, is erroneous. The Court
has consistently held that a man's sincerity cannot be measured by
his material possessions. 130 The conclusion is inescapable: Although
a state may indeed have an interest in ensuring that only serious
candidates get on the ballot, filing fees are neither necessary nor
rationally related to the furtherance of that state interest. 131
The final argument advanced to justify the fees presents perhaps
the clearest example of the clash between the value of access and the
Progressive drive for restriction. It is the problem of ballot control,
which formed the basis for many of the ballot reform efforts of the
Progressives and their ideological descendants. This argument has
been phrased by various courts as a desire to minimize voter confusion, 132 to limit the number of run-off elections, 133 to curb "ballot
flooding," 134 and to prevent the overwhelming of voting machines. 13 G
In essence the ballot size argument stands for the proposition that
an orderly and compact electoral process will lessen political manipulation and ensure that the election results in a truer expression of
the will of the majority.
The argument is not a frivolous one; the reasoning behind it
is demonstrably sound. There is no question that the state has
an interest in assuring such ends. 136 The problem is that it con129. A. HEARD, THE Com OF DEMOCRACY 35 (1960).
130. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.
346, 363-64 (1970). But cf. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4215 (U.S. Feb, 24,
1972), for the suggestion that "(t]here may well be some rational relationship between
a candidate's willingness to pay a filing fee and the seriousness with which he takes
his candidacy ••• .'' To use this relationship, however, to justify a filing fee would
necessitate a significant departure from the Court's position in Boddie and Turner.
131. The seriousness argument was refuted in Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179,
182 (S.D. Ala. 1970), as follows:
There is difficulty in how it is to be determined whether a candidate is serious.
Is a "serious" candidate one who is able to expend a good deal of money on his
campaigning? If so, this is unacceptable as a standard. The wealth of the individual
candidate is too cynical a test to be applied to the legitimacy of his effort. A poor
man may be as "serious" in his campaign as a wealthy one, and has the right to
seek office with or without capital outlay.
It is no answer that those candidates without money cannot "seriously" hope to
win. It may be that modern politics is such that low budgets lose elections; but,
those with low budgets are entitled to try.
132. Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179, 181 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
133. Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550, 553 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
134. Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 927 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970).
135. Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318, 321 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
136. See Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4214-15 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), affg,
Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
32-35 (1968).
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flicts with another widely held notion: equal access to the ballot.
This conflict is in reality a disagreement on means, since advocates of
both positions share the common goal of making the political system
more responsive to citizen demands. The issue, translated into equal
protection terminology, is whether the values behind the state interest are "compelling" enough to justify infringement on the values
of equal access to the political system. Under present doctrine, the
answer is no. Although there admittedly is a legitimate state interest
in ballot control, fees are neither necessary nor rationally connected to that end. Wealth is not related to any personal characteristic that would justify keeping individuals off the ballot. It does not
accurately reflect a candidate's seriousness in running for office. In
this respect it is therefore arbitrary: there is no more reason to justify
restricting the ballot on the basis of wealth than there is to restrict
it on the basis of occupation, hair color, or the size of an individual's
rock collection. Moreover, there is some indication that the Court
does not feel that ballot control itself is a compelling interest.137
On the other hand, our strong aversion to classifications based on
wealth does give reason to strike down such fees. This reasoning was
illustrated by the Court in the poll tax cases: ."To introduce wealth
or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant. In this context-that is, as a condition of obtaining
a ballot-the requirement of fee paying causes an 'invidious discrimination' . . . ." 138 Other methods exist that are equally effective in
regulating the ballot yet do not impose such discrimination.139 Reasonable petition requirements, for example, create classifications that
are not only less offensive but are also related to the state interest
they are serving. 14°For these reasons, it appears that the ballot control
137. Finally Ohio claims that its highly restrictive provisions are justified because
without them a Iar~e number of parties might qualify for the ballot, and the voters
would then be confronted with a choice so confusing that the popular will could
be frustrated. But the experience of manv States ..• demonstrates that no more
than a handful of parties attempts to qualify for ballot positions even when a very
low number of signatures, such as 1% of the electorate, is required. It is true that
the existence of multitudinous fragmentary groups might justify some regulatory
control but in Ohio at the present time this danger seems to us no more than
"theoretically imaginable."
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
138. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
139. The Court has recognized the availability of alternative means of achieving the
state's goal as a factor to be considered in judging the validity of state restrictions. In
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971), the Court struck down entry fees for
divorce cases partially on the ground that "other alternatives exist to fees and cost
requirements as a means for conserving the time of courts and protecting parties from
frivolous litigation."
140. Petitions will require that a candidate demonstrate at least minimal public
support. Therefore, restriction of the ballot on that basis will be likely to keep off the
ballot only those candidates with no public support. Assuming that the state has some
interest in keeping candidates with no public support off the ballot, a petition require•
ment bears some relation to the state interest it purports to serve. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1970).
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argument will not be found compelling enough to ouhveigh the imposition made on access to the electoral system. The filing fee system
posited in the model then cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Yield it must to the rights of the elector and the candidate guaranteed
by the equal protection clause.
c. Abandoning the model. It remains only to determine whether
any variations on the basic model would render a filing fee system
compatible with the requirements of equal protection. The model
system imposed fees on general elections. The lower courts have
generally felt that the imposition of fees in primary elections is acceptable. This distinction cannot be sustained. The Court has consistently held that in view of the part played by primaries in the
over-all electoral scheme, constitutional safeguards are equally applicable to both primary and general elections. 141 It can no longer be
argued that the primary election may be conducted by the state without fulfilling equal protection requirements; when the state acts to
provide and promote primaries, it must comply with the commands
of equal protection. 142 Nor can it be argued that primaries are exempt
from equal protection strictures if voters are free to choose whomever
they wish in the general election. As the Court noted in United States
v. Classic, 143 "the practical operation of the primary law ... is such
as to impose serious restrictions upon the choice of candidates by
voters save by voting at the primary election." 144 Moreover, even if
choice were not so restricted, the great practical importance of party
affiliation in the general election will lead the Court to apply the full
equal protection guarantee to primary elections. 14 G
Indeed, it may be that the individual harm is greater in primaries
than in general elections since primary candidates are oft_en forced to
rely more heavily on their own resources. One observer, after examining several congressional races in California concluded that
the level of public interest was much lower during the primary campaign, making it more difficult to mobilize resources. Only after campaigns had reached a high level in the autumn did the inexperienced
workers, smaU contributors, and the normany nonpolitical groups
volunteer or even respond to the candidates pleas for help. Consequently, candidates could rely less upon the resources that the
141. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (19:i3): Smith v. Alhvright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932): Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
142. See Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 42ll, 4213 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), affg. Carter v.
Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
143. 313 U.S. 299 (1941),
144. 313 U.S. at 313.
145. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4215 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), a[fg. Carter v.
Dies, 321 }·. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
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public, parties, or groups could contribute, and had to rely more
upon their own personal resources. 146

In any event, it is now clear that no filing fee scheme for primary
elections can be upheld if a similar fee in general elections is unconstitutional.
Neither should a fee be saved if it is collected by the party rather
than the state since "the recognition of the place of the primary in
the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of
the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation
of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the
State."147 Likewise, fees that are used to pay for election expenses
will be viewed in the same light as those whose proceeds go to the
general fund. As pointed out above, 148 the collection of revenue is
not a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify the harm caused
by the fees to individual candidates.
The amount of the fee appears on the surface to be relevant to
the equal protection argument. As a logical matter, the amount of
the harm should decrease as the amount of the fee decreases. There
are indications in the Carter decision that the Court may have
adopted this logic, 140 but careful analysis shows that this approach
cannot be sustained. Just as the harm would decrease with the amount
of the fee, the value of the fee in furtherance of a state interest
would also decrea,se at a roughly proportional rate. Although there is
less harm in smaller fees, there is also less justification for their imposition.150 Even if this were not the case, the apparent judicial dislike for determining the reasonableness of fees 11i1 would suggest that
courts will hesitate to draw lines at the other end of the spectrum
to serve as a basis for determining harmlessness.
The final manner in which several fee systems differ from the
model is in their provision for some reasonable alternative method
for a candidate to appear on the ballot. The courts that struck down
filing fees stated that such a provision would save the constitu· 146. D. LEUTHOLD, ELECTIONEERING IN A DEMOCRACY: CAMPAIGNS FOR CONGRESS 37-38
(1968). For a further discussion of the importance of primary elections in the democratic
system, see Comment, supra note 13, at 132-33.
147. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
148. See text accompanying notes 125-27 supra.
149. See 40 U.S.L.W. at 4215-16.
150. For example, a fee of S5 may indeed be less damaging to a candidate than a
fee of S500. But that fee would also be much less effective in furthering the state's in-

terest in raising revenue, ensuring serious candidates, and controlling the ballot. In terms
of the compelling interest test, the smaller fees would be even less "necessary to" or
"related to" a state interest than would the large fees. Cf. Turner v. Fouthe, 396 U.S.
346, 363 (1970).
151. See pt. IV. A. supra.
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tionality of the fee system. 152 None, however, stated why these systems would be more compatible with equal protection. The probable
cause of such omissions is that there is no way to reconcile such options with the requirements of equal protection.
·
In analyzing the effect of an option provision in filing fee systems,
the initial question is whether strict scrutiny is required. Any such
provision would, on the basis of Justice Harlan's terminology,m
create a "suspect" classification based on wealth by forcing poor candidates to take a different path to the ballot than their wealthy opponents.154 The crucial question is whether there is a state interest
behind the alternative "compelling" enough to outweigh the harm
caused to individual voters and candidates. um
One device that may be used to create an option is a provision
allowing a voter to write in the name of any candidate not on the
ballot. 11m But this mechanism does not lessen the harm caused a candidate or voter by a filing fee system since it is in reality no option
at all. Justice Douglas recognized this in his concurring opinion in
Williams: "[T]he write-ins are no substitute for a place on the ballot"
for "[tlo force a candidate to rely on ·write-ins is to burden him
with disability. It makes it more difficult for him to get elected, and
for voters to elect him." 157 In a similar vein an earlier observer remarked that
the right is of no value except when exercised in a concerted movement, when it sometimes results in the nomination or election of the
candidate. It should be pointed out, though, that this is infrequent,
and the candidate whose name is not printed on the ballot stands
little chance of election or nomination, as the case may be. 1 GS
The effective result is that the classification caused by the fee is unchanged, and the system remains void under the equal protection
clause.
152. See Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. sub nom.
Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 42II (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972); Georgia Socialist Workers
Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (N.D. Ga. 1970), affd. on other grounds sub
nom. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179, 182
(S.D. Ala. 1970); Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 929 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dis•
missed sub nom. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970).
153. See text accompanying notes 98-101 supra.
154. The Court has often held that a scheme need not completely eliminate electoral
rights in order to violate equal protection. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
155. See text accompanying note II4 supra.
156. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN, § 6.1737(4) (1956), which reads: "If the elector wishes
to vote for a candidate not on any ticket, he may write or place the name of such can•
didate on his ticket opposite the name of the office and make a cross (X) in the circle
under the party name."
157. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 37 (1968).
158. J. HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 176 (1934),
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A second proposed option is to allow a candidate to file a pauper's
affidavit in lieu of paying the fee. 159 It may be argued that such a
provision greatly reduces any harm by allowing a poor candidate an
easy method of getting on the ballot. The stigma of filing such an
affidavit, however, will cause some initial harm by deterring candidates from filing; further, it may lessen their chance of success by
lowering their public reputation. More importantly, such a scheme
destroys whatever initial justification there is for fees. If, as noted
above, the only possible justification for a filing fee is to control
ballot size, a system that allows candidates to get on the ballot by
filing an affidavit cannot truly be said to reach that goal. It can instead be intended only to stigmatize and discredit poor candidates160
or to raise revenue from the wealthy,161 both of which are improper
objectives for an electoral regulation. This option therefore is not
justified by a compelling state interest and is ineffective to save the
constitutionality of a fee system under the equal protection clause.
The final and most widely used option would allow a candidate
to submit a filing fee in lieu of nominating petitions.162 This pla~
would reduce the individual harm by allowing a poor candidate to
reach the ballot without any particular stigma attaching to nonpayment of the fee. The fact remains, however, that a poorer candidate
is put at a definite disadvantage by law since he must demonstrate
a degree of support prior to the election while a person paying the
fee need demonstrate none. The harm, though reduced, is still
sufficient to outweigh the state interest since the latter is even less
compelling under this plan than under a mandatory fee system.
Under a mandatory plan, the fee could at least be justified as a
method of controlling ballot size. The petition option does not
offer that justification since ballot control will be achieved primarily
through petitions rather than fees. The state has thus recognized the
availability and validity of petitions as a method of control. The
only justification for the fees under the plan would be to reduce
the state's workload in validating and checking the petitions. This
159. Presently the only statute with such a provision is TEX. ELECT10N CODE art.
13.07a (Supp. 1971), which provides:
If a candidate is unable to pay the deposit or filing fee ••• in lieu of payment he
may file ••• a petition of voters ••• [which] shall be accompanied by the following
affidavit: "I am not financially able to pay the filing fee required to file for the
office set forth in the attached petition. In lieu thereof I submit the following
petition ••••"
160. The Court has in the past struck down statutes that tend to stigmatize or em•
barrass certain groups. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
161. Similarly, revenue raising cannot be considered a compelling state interest.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
162. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1163 (Supp. 1971), which reads in part: "To
obtain the printing of the name of any person ••• upon the official primary ballots
• • • there shall be filed • • • nominating petitions . • . • In lieu thereof, a filing fee of
$100.00 ......
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would clearly be an insufficiently compelling interest
to justify the
3
disadvantage to which poorer candidates are put. 0
V.

SUMMARY

The Progressive movement gave great impetus to the belief that
the democratic ideal could be attained only if the mechanics of the
electoral process allow the voter to make a reasoned choice at the
polling place. This goal could be best achieved by making the operation of voting as simple as possible and by ensuring close supervision
of elected officials. In later years, many segments of the society came
to view access to the political system as the best way of carrying
forward democratic principles. Although these ideas are not mutually
exclusive, they did come into conflict upon the question of candidate
filing fees.
The courts have now been forced under the rubric of the equal
protection doctrine to consider this conflict in values. While they
have differed in their outcomes, a proper analysis of the problem
under equal protection doctrine shows that ballot access is given
priority by the Constitution. This analysis also discloses that all fee
systems presently in use, despite their individualized and differing
content, are invalid under equal protection standards.

163. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618, 634-35 (1969), in which tile Court rejected the argument that such administrative considerations are compelling state Interests.

